An Outsider Who Misappropriates Confidential Information My Be Charged with Securities Fraud: United States v. Newman by Falconer, Michael J.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 31 
Issue 4 Summer 1982 Article 6 
An Outsider Who Misappropriates Confidential Information My Be 
Charged with Securities Fraud: United States v. Newman 
Michael J. Falconer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Michael J. Falconer, An Outsider Who Misappropriates Confidential Information My Be Charged with 
Securities Fraud: United States v. Newman, 31 DePaul L. Rev. 849 (1982) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol31/iss4/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
AN OUTSIDER WHO MISAPPROPRIATES
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION MAY BE
CHARGED WITH SECURITIES FRAUD:
UNITED STATES V. NEWMAN
Fraud in the securities market is a wide-spread contemporary problem.1
The roots of society's concern regarding securities fraud stem back to the
period of the Great Depression.2 During the Depression, Congress enacted
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' (1934 Act) as a mechanism for regulating
the sale and purchase of securities.4 Pursuant to section 10(b), a major anti-
fraud provision of the 1934 Act,' the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) promulgated rule lOb-5 to inhibit the incidence of fraud.' Rule lOb-5
1. See, e.g., Wall St. J., July 14, 1982, at 14, col. I (Midwest ed.) (officers and directors
of Flow General, Inc. accused of securities fraud); Wall St. J., July 13, 1982, at 13, col. 3
(Midwest ed.) (chairman of Brady Energy Corporation charged with securities fraud); Fogelson,
Disclosure Laws Retain Teeth Despite Recent Court Limitations, Nat. L.J., Feb. 22, 1982,
at 30, col. 1 (market analysts accused of securities fraud for spreading fraudulent rumors);
Chi. Tribune, Jan. 22, 1982, at 22 (insider trading suspected to acquisition by Sears, Roebuck
& Co. of Dean Whitter Reynolds).
2. For a discussion of this financial crisis and the impact it had on the public's confidence
in the stock market, see generally W. LEUCHTENBERo, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND THE
NEW DEAL 1932-40 (1963); M. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 142-80
(1970); A. SCHLESINGER, HISTORY OF THE NEW DEAL (1958); Landis, The Legislative History
of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959).
3. Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c-kk (1976)).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1934), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER
& E. MAKER, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934, at Item 20 (Act regulates securities trading by banning the use of misleading
statements for the purpose of inducing the purchasing or selling of securities, the sale or pur-
chase for the purpose of fixing the price, and the disclosure of privileged information entrusted
to specialists) [hereinafter cited as ELLENBERGER & MAHER]; 78 CONG. REC. 2264, 2271 (1934),
reprinted in 4 ELLENBERGER & MAHER, supra, at Item 5 (Act regulates sale and purchase of
securities, thereby insuring that the market will be completely open to investors and will curb
past abuses by directors and officers by placing strict limitations on all trading practices). For
a synopsis of each section of the Act see 78 CONG. REC. 8160, 8164 (1934), reprinted in 4
ELLENBERGER & MAHER, supra, at Item 10.
5. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
6. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). See also James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944,
948 (6th Cir. 1973) (purpose of lOb-5 is to protect public from unfair securities practices).
Accord Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 986 (6th Cir. 1976).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 31:849
prohibits affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities.' This rule has become the primary tool by
which the SEC combats fraudulent insider trading.'
Generally, insider trading involves an individual who is privy to confi-
dential business information by virtue of his position within a company.
In the context of corporate acquisitions, the insider usually maintains a
position with either the acquiring company or the company that is targeted
for acquisition. Because the price of the target stock typically rises when
news of the impending acquisition is disclosed, the insider often profits from
his advance knowledge by purchasing stock of the target corporation while
the price is low and selling the stock after publication of the acquisition
has yielded an increase in its price. For decades, case law involving rule
lOb-5 had been expanding liability to include more than this traditional
characterization of the insider. 9 That expansion was halted,' 0 however, when
7. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
8. See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir. 1977) (10b-5 is the "cornerstone"
of the Federal Securities System); SEC v. R.S. Allen & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 886, 876 (S.D.
Fla. 1974) (10b-5 is a major tool for combating unfair securities practices). Cf. SEC v. National
Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (10b-5 is the most litigated of securities rules). See
generally 5 A. JAcoBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 § 1 (1980) (10b-5 is the most important
securities anti-fraud provision) [hereinafter cited as JAcoBs]; Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and
Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. RaV. 322 (1979)
(Rule lOb-5 is an important mechanism for prohibiting trading based on inside information).
9. A traditional insider is a director, officer, or shareholder owning more than 10% of
the equity security of the issuing corporation. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976).
Courts and commentators, however, have suggested a variety of persons who should be defined
as an insider and, thus, subjected to liability. See, e.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407
F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968) (the corporation itself), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967) (agents for the insider), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Poole, Corporate "Insiders" Face More Regulation, 48 MICH. ST. B. J. 28 (1963) (investment
bankers, management consultants). See also 2 A. BROMBERO, SEcuRrTIs LAW: FaAUD § 7.4(6)(b)
(1982) (insider hard to define because meaning lies outside organization charts or other well-
defined relationships).
10. It is argued that the United States Supreme Court is pursuing a retrenchment policy
which seeks to limit the scope of § 10(b). See 5 JACOBS, supra note 8, § 7, at n.9.01. This
trend is exemplified in several Supreme Court cases. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (negligent conduct not within purview of § 10(b)); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (§ 10(b) private actions can only be brought
by plaintiffs who are purchasers or sellers of stock). See also Note, Rule lob-5 and Non-
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the Supreme Court ruled that an individual who was not a member of either
the acquiring or the target company had not committed securities fraud upon
the sellers of stock when he traded based upon information misappropriated
from another source." The Court left unresolved the issue of whether the
information theft itself could be considered securities fraud.'2
This issue was squarely addressed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States v. Newman.'" The defendant in Newman held no position
with either the acquiring or the target company and, thus, was not a tra-
ditional insider under rule lOb-5. 4 Instead, the defendant gained access to
the confidential corporate acquisition plans by his involvement in a con-
spiracy with an employee of an investment banking firm.'" Although the
banking firm maintained only an advisory role in the impending securities
transactions, the Newman court held that the defendant's misappropriation
of confidential information via the bank employee was a breach of fiduciary
duty sufficient to uphold a criminal indictment for securities fraud.'"
The result in Newman is laudable because to effectuate a major purpose
of the 1834 Act-maintaining the integrity of the securities market' 7-there
must be an enforcement mechanism to prevent trading based on stolen in-
formation. Inadequacies in the Newman court's method of analyzing tra-
ditional lOb-5 concepts, however, make it doubtful that the conclusion
reached in this decision will withstand close scrutiny. The Newman court's
approach to securities fraud is not only unprecedented but also doctrinally
distorted. Moreover, because the Newman decision institutes a new theory
of liability whch is not expressly mandated by statute or legislative history,
a constitutional argument exists that the defendant did not receive fair notice
that his behavior was illegal.'"
Traditional Insiders: The Supreme Court Continues Its Retrenchment Trend-Chiarela v. United
States, 30 DEPAuL L. REv. 181, 189 (1980) (Court is moving toward conservative position under
lOb-5). Cf. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
700 (1974) (need restraints to prevent rule from covering corporate universe).
11. United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Justice Blackmun, in dissent, noted
the Court's retrenchment policy. Id. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12. See id. at 236-37.
13. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
14. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
15. 664 F.2d at 15.
16. Id. at 18.
17. See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969) (pur-
pose of Act is the promotion of free and open public securities markets), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 822 (1970); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083,
1101 (S.DN.Y. 1969) (Act intended to insure purity of securities transactions and prevent
manipulation), aff'd, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 6 (1971);
Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1275-76 (1965) (an essential function of the
1934 Act is keeping the market free from manipulation). For a discussion of the congressional
intent underlying the 1934 Act, see H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6, 10 (1934);
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 9 (1934).
18. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (vagueness or lack of notice
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Section 10(b)' 9 of the 1934 Act was enacted as part of a congressional
scheme to eliminate fraudulent stock practices which were thought to have
contributed to the stock market crash of 1929.20 This section broadly pro-
hibits fraud by proscribing any manipulative or deceptive device utilized in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Although the legislative
history is scant, 2 one principal legislative draftsman22 termed section 10(b)
a catchall provision designed to prohibit "any cunning device" used to
manipulate the market for personal gain. 3 Courts and commentators have
recognized that a major purpose of this section was to restore investor con-
fidence in the securities market"4 which was perceived as favoring insiders.2"
The prohibitions set forth in section 10(b) were given specific force when
that conduct is unlawful violates basic principles of due process). Cf. Bouie v. City of Colum-
bia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964) (defendant's due process rights are violated when a court
overrules a consistent line of procedural decisions).
19. See supra note 5.
20. See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.), S. Res. 56 and
S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.) before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 5-7, 394 (1934). These hearings convinced Congress that those with superior wealth and
superior information had manipulated the market causing the price distortions which resulted
in the crash. Id.
21. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 (1979) (legislative history gives
no direct clue to scope of § 10(b)). See generally 5 JACOBS, supra note 8, § 5.01.
22. Thomas C. Corcoran was the principal spokesman for the Roosevelt administration during
the House Committee hearings on the 1934 Act. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
2-3 (1934), reprinted in 5 ELLENBEROER & MAHER, supra note 4, at Item 18.
23. Corcoran's remarks, although only semi-official, are the most explicit legislative history
available. They have been cited often by courts. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 766 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (under the catchall provision, the
commission can deal with manipulative devices); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th
Cir. 1970) (§ 10(b) is a catchall to reach practices contrary to public interest); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839 (2d Cir. 1968) (§ 10(b) has been recognized as a catchall
from its inception), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Garner v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 591,
595 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (statute and rule designed to catch infinite variety of manipulative devices).
24. See, e.g., Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 413 F.2d 353, 357 (7th Cir.
1969) (10b-5 suit should be permitted when victimization by securities dealers could impair
public confidence in the integrity of the market), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970); Sym-
posium, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1010 (1965) (investor confidence essen-
tial for capital markets); Comment, Insider Trading on the Open Market: Nondisclosure and
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 309; 314 (1969) (investor confidence is the foundation
of securities market); Comment, Rationalizing Liability for Nondisclosure Under lob-5: Equal
Access to Information and United States v. Chiarella, I Wis. L. REv. 162, 183 (1980) (primary
congressional goals are investor confidence and fairness).
25. Evidence of the connection between insider trading and corporate manipulations was
often mentioned in congressional hearings. See Banking, Financing and Securities Sales Prac-
tices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) (discussion appears throughout the seven volumes), cited
in Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 HARv. L. REV. 322, 334 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brudneyl.
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the SEC, pursuant to its rule-making authority,"6 promulgated rule lOb-5.
Rule lOb-5 prohibits any person from making an untrue statement, engaging
in any act, or employing any device that defrauds any person in connec-
tion with the purchase of securities." The major remedies established under
the rule were developed in the context of SEC administrative proceedings"8
and private damage actions. 9 In addition, criminal sanctions for wilful
violations of rule lOb-5 are available under section 32(a), 30 but rarely have
been used."
Courts initially relied on the common law fraud concept of deceit3" to
26. The SEC is empowered under 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (Supp. 1980), to create rules for
the enforcement of § 10(b). See Hadsell v. Hoover, 484 F.2d 123, 126 (10th Cir. 1973) (rule
lOb-5 was valid exercise of SEC's power); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783,
786 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum) (rule lob-5 was validly promulgated by SEC pursuant to § 10(b));
United States v. Shindler, 173 F. Supp. 393, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (rule lOb-5 was valid
exercise of SEC quasi-legislative powers); Note, The Prospects for Rule X-lOB-5: An Emerging
Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1139 (1950) (rule lob-5 clearly within
scope of SEC's power, no abuse of discretion).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). For the text of this rule, see supra note 7.
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(v) (1976). The SEC had the authority to initiate its own investiga-
tions and to make and publish determinations regarding conduct it perceives to be in violation
of the Act. Id. § 78(v)(a). Additionally, the SEC has the power to subpoena witnesses, id.
§ 78(v)(b), and seek injunctions in federal court to prevent continuing violations. Id. § 78(v)(d).
29. An implied private right of action was first recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court acknowledged this right 25
years later. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) ("[i]t is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b)").
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. 1978). Section 32(a) pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter, or any rule or
regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance
of which is required under the terms of this chapter .. . shall upon conviction
be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years ...
For a discussion of criminal sanctions under the Act, see generally Herlands, Criminal Law
Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (1934).
31. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978) was the first case in which
an outsider was prosecuted criminally for violating the anti-fraud provisions of rule lOb-5 by
failing to disclose. To date there have been no other reported cases in which criminal liability
was imposed for failure to disclose under rule lOb-5. Id. at 1373. For a discussion of the
use of criminal sanctions under the Act, see generally A. BROMBERO, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD
§ 10.3 (1982); Matthews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related
Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 901,
908' n.39 (1971); Note, The Securities and Exchange Commission: An Introduction to the En-
forcement of the Criminal Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 17 AM. CRiM. L. Rav.
121, 121 n.9 (1979).
32. The common law tort of deceit requires proof of (1) a false representation; (2) knowledge
or belief that the representation is false (scienter); (3) an intention to induce the plaintiff to
act or to refrain from acting; (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (5) damages based
on such reliance. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. For a discussion of the early reliance of the courts on
common law principles in interpreting rule lOb-5, see 5 JACOBS, supra note 8, §§ 2.10.03, 14.
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interpret the meaning of securities fraud under rule lOb-5. The gravamen
of the common law offense was that by misrepresenting a material fact,
a party to a transaction took unfair advantage of the other party in the
transaction." The infirmity of this common law approach was that it failed
to recognize that mere silence or failure to disclose material facts also could
deceive the other party." ' Despite this flaw, the common law fraud require-
ment of deceit between the parties to a transaction remained at the core
of subsequent development of securities fraud.
Like the common law fraud concept of deceit, rule lOb-5 on its face im-
poses no penalty for mere silence.3 3 The courts, however, eventually began
to realize that securities fraud often involved one party taking advantage
of another by trading based on undisclosed information. Thus, to fulfill the
regulatory intent of the 1934 Act, a need existed to go beyond the common
33. See, e.g., Alexander v. Church, 53 Conn. 561, 562, 4 A. 103, 104 (1886) ("Fraud con-
sists in deception practiced in order to induce another to part with property or surrender some
legal right, and which accomplishes the end desired") (quoting COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT 474 (1880)). There
was also a more elastic concept known as "equitable fraud" which did not require proof of
deception. See Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1889) (fraud involves all acts, omis-
sions, and concealments which are a breach of equitable duty, confidence, or trust that injure
another); Patrick, Rule lOb-5, Equitable Fraud and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: Another Case
in the Continuing Development of Federal Corporation Law, 21 ALA. L. REV. 457, 457 (1969)
(a federal cause of action exists under rule lOb-5 when securities are purchased at an inade-
quate price by a stockbroker whether or not deception was involved).
34. The majority rule under common law was that an insider had no duty to disclose. See,
e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 361, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933) (director has no duty
to disclose to stockholder). A minority of jurisdictions, however, found this rule too harsh
and imposed a duty to disclose when the insider had a fiduciary relationship with the other
party. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 367-68, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (1903) (director must
disclose to stockholder if the information affects the selling price and the release will not hurt
the company). Some jurisdictions adopted a third position which imposed a duty to disclose
when the insider had special facts in his possession. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S.
419, 431 (1909) (duty to disclose based on special knowledge of possible sale of company's
assets). See also Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule lob-5: The
Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 121, 123-24 (1962) (discussion of pre-10b-5 cases
under the special facts rule). For a general discussion of the common law's gradual recognition
of silence as fraud, see R. JENNINGs & H. MARSH, SECuRITEs REGULATION 946 (4th ed. 1977);
Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market
Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 802-03 (1973).
35. See supra note 7. Clause (b) of the rule refers to a failure to state material facts which
are necessary to correct statements previously made. Thus, under a literal reading of the rule
there is no liability imposed for total silence. See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 250 F. Supp.
112, 116 n.5 (D. Mass.) (clause (b) does not appear to cover silence), rev'd on other grounds,
361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 767-68
(D. Colo. 1964) (clause (b) only applies when some statement already made); Cochran v. Channing
Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (clause (b) requires a statement to already have
been made); Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
473, 492-95 (1967) (corporate silence not covered by clause (b)); Comment, Rationalizing Liability
for Nondisclosure Under lOb-5; Equal Access to Information and United States v. Chiarella,
1 Wis. L. REV. 162, 165 (1980) (no liability for absolute silence under lOb-5).
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law and impose a duty to disclose. 6 Under such an approach, a failure to
disclose material information in the course of a securities transaction con-
stitutes a breach of duty and, thus, securities fraud. Under this approach,
insider trading is clearly securities fraud because such activity is predicated
upon one party's failure to disclose material information to another."
The scope of activities encompassed by insider trading has undergone con-
siderable expansion.3" The duty to disclose was first applied to corporate
officers and directors. In Kardon v. National Gypsum, 39 corporate officers
committed a 1Ob-5 violation when they bought out shareholders without
disclosing that a substantially higher price was available from an acquiring
corporation."0 The duty breached by the corporate officials was premised
on their fiduciary relationship' with the shareholders.
Subsequently, the duty to disclose was extended from traditional insiders,
such as corporate officers, to "tippees", individuals who received informa-
tion from insiders. In In re Cady, Roberts & Co., " the SEC found an in-
vestment broker guilty of fraud under rule lOb-5 when he traded based on
confidential information acquired from a director of the issuing corporation.' 3
The Cady, Roberts court based the broker's duty to disclose on two factors:
36. The courts have been willing to interpret rule lOb-5 as requiring such a duty. See Arber
v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir. 1974) (rule lob-5 is necessarily a disclosure
rule); Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (10b-5 is "basically
a disclosure provision"). See also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 843 (D.
Del. 1951) (controlling shareholder who buys out minority shareholder had duty to disclose
both greatly appreciated inventory value and plan to sell corporation in order to capture that
appreciation). For a discussion of the justification for finding disclosure as an underlying policy
of rule lOb-5, see generally 5 JACOBS supra note 8, § 6.05.
37. "One of the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act . . . was to outlaw the
use of inside information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own finan-
cial advantage to the detriment of uniformed public security holders." Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 803, 819 (D. Del. 1951). See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974) (Act designed to promote fair dealing by
requiring full disclosure of inside information); Radiation Dynamic, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464
F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972) (purpose of Act is to preclude insiders from taking unfair advan-
tage of investors without equal access to information).
38. See Note, Rule lob-5: Scope of Liability Extended as Former Outsiders Become Market
Insiders, 58 NEB. L. REv. 866, 868 (1979) (increasing tendency of courts to find liability based
on inside information even with no insider relationship). See also Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders
and Informational Advantages Under Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322, 339 (1979)
(scope of insiders has been extended to brokers, offeror's satellites, and columnists).
39. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
40. Id. at 802.
41. A fiduciary relation exists in the broadest sense whenever one trusts or relies upon another.
See PROSSER, supra note 32, § 106, at 697. According to Prosser, examples of fiduciary relation-
ships that have required disclosure include: principal and agent, executor and beneficiary of
an estate, bank and investing depositor, majority and minority stockholders, old friends, at-
torney and client, physician and patient, priest and parishioner, partners, tenants in common,
husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, as well as types of contracts such
as suretyship, guaranty, insurance, and joint venture. Id.
42. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
43. Id. at 912.
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(1) the inherent unfairness of taking advantage of nonpublic information,
and (2) the broker's special relationship with the company. The decision
focused mainly on the director's fiduciary relationship to his corporation.
The SEC concluded that the director's relationship, with its concommitant
duty to disclose, could not be avoided merely because the director did not
trade himself. Analyzing the duty as vicarious, the SEC reasoned that because
the director's fiduciary relation gave rise to a duty not to trade, this same
duty passed with his tip, and thus, the broker-tippee also was prohibited
from trading.'
Subsequently, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur," the focus of the analysis
shifted from concern with corporate relationships to considerations of fairness.
The officers and employees of Texas Gulf Sulphur Corporation committed
securities fraud by purchasing shares of the corporation's stock without
disclosing their knowledge of a valuable corporate mineral discovery." The
Second Circuit, looking exclusively at the fairness element of Cady, Roberts,
stated the essence of rule lOb-5:
[Alnyone who, trading for his own account in the securities of a corpora-
tion, has "access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
of anyone" may not take advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing."'
Because all the defendants in Texas Gulf maintained a fiduciary
relationship"' to the company, the court could have based the duty to
disclose on those relationships. Instead, in dicta,1' the court framed a broad
disclosure rule stating that: "anyone in possesson of material inside infor-
mation must either disclose it to the investing public or . . .refrain from
trading. . . ."" Such a broad rule, when applied in the context of corporate
acquisition plans, would prohibit trading on the basis of confidential infor-
mation even by outsiders who maintained no relationship with either the
acquiring or target corporation.
44. Id. One commentator found Cady, Roberts to be seminal because it clearly established
that nondisclosure was fraud under rule lOb-5 and that the rule could reach nondisclosure by
persons who would not be defined as insiders under common law or by the terms of other
sections of the Exchange Act. Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule
lOb-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 121, 122 (1962). See also 6 L. Loss,
SECURITrrs REGULATION, 3561 (2d ed. 1961) (contract with close relation of an insider is treated
like a contract with the insider himself).
45. 40 S.E.C. at 912.
46. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
47. Id. at 852.
48. Id. at 848 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
49. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (listing defen-
dants and their relationships to the company).
50. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1378 (1978) (McSkill, J., dissenting) (Texas
Gulf rule merely dicta); Comment, The Dutiful Relationships of Section 10(b): The Chiarella
Decisions, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 637, 643 (1981) (Texas Gulf rule is dicta as applied to non-
insiders).
51. 401 F.2d at 833.
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It is important to note that even under the Texas Gulf court's broad
interpretation of rule lOb-5, the rule only proscribes fraud that occurs
in the relationship between buyers and sellers. Therefore, in accordance
with the common law approach, fraud under the Texas Gulf rule exists
when one party to a transaction uses deceit to profit at the expense of
the other party.
Courts have been reluctant to extend liability for nondisclosure to
outsiders5" except in cases of exceptional unfairness.' 3 This reluctance was
exemplified in Chiarella v. United States." Chiarella was a printer who
worked for a firm that prepared the paperwork involved in corporate ac-
quisitions. Through his work he obtained confidential information regarding
impending corporate acquisitions, and used the information to buy stock
of the target companies at a relatively low price. Once the information became
public and the securities rose in price, he was able to sell the securities for
a substantial profit." The Second Circuit acknowledged that Chiarella was
not affiliated with either the acquiring corporation or the target corporation
and, thus, owed no fiduciary duty to either entity. Absent such a fiduciary
relationship, the court held that Chiarella's conduct could not subject him
to civil liability for securities fraud based on breach of the duty to disclose.56
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found Chiarella criminally liable for securities.
fraud because he was a "market insider", a person with regular access to
confidential market information. As such, he owed a duty to disclose the
information or refrain from trading on the market as a whole. 7 The Supreme
Court reversed the finding of criminal liability 8 reasoning that although
silence could operate as a fraud in some instances, a duty to speak must
be premised on a fiduciary relationship." Because Chiarella had no previous
relationship with those who sold him stock, he had no duty to disclose the
confidential information. The Court rejected the theory that market insiders
owe a duty to the entire market reasoning that such a duty could not be
implied from either the legislative history or the explicit language of section
10(b)." Furthermore, because the question of liability based on the defen-
52. See, e.g., Frigitemp v. Financial Dynamics Fund, 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975)
(no lOb-5 claim because corporate outsiders have no duty to disclose); General Time v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968) (company making a tender offer was under
no duty to disclose its intentions to target company), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
53. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (bankers
who were neither insiders nor tippees held liable due to trust reposed in them); Zweig v. Hearst
Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979) (financial columnist liable for fraudulent nondisclosure
based on the relationship of trust with his readers when he bought stock in anticipation that
his published recommendations would cause its price to rise); Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Co., 419 F.2d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 1969) (duty to disclose when tender offeror acts in concert
with target management), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1972).
54. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
55. 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
56. Id. at 1364.
57. Id. at 1365.
58. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225 (1980).
59. Id. at 224.
60. Id. at 233. "We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general
duty between all participants in a market transaction to forgo [sic] actions based on material,
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dant's breach of duty to his own employer had not been properly presented
to the jury, the Court refused to speculate on this issue.6 1 Two years after
Chiarella, however, in United States v. Newman,'6 2 the Second Circuit faced
this precise question.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
John Newman, a securities trader, allegedly received secret "market
information" 3 concerning corporate acquisition plans." This information
had been misappropriated from the investment banking firms of Morgan
Stanley and Kuhn Loeb. The information was passed on to Newman by
employees of these firms who were involved in assisting corporate clients
in the elaborate preparations incident to mergers, tender offers, and take-
over bids. Newman passed the acquisition information to two confederates
who purchased .stock in the target companies. After the proposed plans were
revealed to the public and the price of the target securities increased, the
conspirators sold their shares for a substantial profit.65
Newman was indicted and charged with securities fraud under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act, mail fraud,6 6 and conspiracy to commit
securities and mail fraud. 7 The district court dismissed the securities fraud
charge because it could find no clear prohibition in the federal securities
laws putting Newman on notice that his conduct was criminal." The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, reasoning that by proscribing
fraudulent and deceptive practices, rule lOb-5 gave Newman clear notice that
his conduct was unlawful.6 9 The majority" held that Newman could be
nonpublic information ... neither the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity
of information rule." Id. Cf. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Respon-
sibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 816 (1973) (imposition of
a duty to disclose on all parties to a transaction undercuts the basic assumptions of our com-
petitive economy) [hereinafter cited as An Initial Inquiry]. But see O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,443 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 17, 1982) (insiders who buy options in their own stock owe duty to market as a whole).
61. 445 U.S. at 236-37.
62. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
63. "Market information" is information concerning events or circumstances which affect
the market for a company's securities but which do not affect the company's assets or earning
power. An Initial Inquiry, supra note 60, at 799.
64. 664 F.2d at 15. The plans included mergers, tender offers, and takeover bids. The plans
were secret because knowledge of the impending acquisition would tend to increase the value
of the stock of the corporation to be acquired (the target corporation). An unscrupulous in-
dividual who knew the secret could buy the stock at the low market price and then resell at
the higher price after the acquisition plans became public knowledge. Id.
65. Id.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) (proscribes any use of the mail for the purpose of ex-
ecuting specified unlawful scheme or artifice to defraud).
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) (proscribes conspiracy to defraud or commit any offense
against the U.S.). The scope of this Note is limited, however, to the securities fraud issue.
68. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024,
91,296 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981).
69. U.S. v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1981).
70. Judge Von Graffeiland wrote the opinion, joined by Judge Newman. The third member
of the panel, Judge Dumbould concurred in the reversal of the district court solely on the
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charged with fraud within the meaning of the 1934 Act because his par-
ticipation in the theft of confidential information was a breach of the
fiduciary duty" he owed to the investment bankers and to the bankers' cor-
porate clients."
THE NEWMAN OPINION
The Second Circuit began its analysis with a review of its decision in
Chiarella and the subsequent reversal of that decision by the Supreme Court."
The indictment in Newman was structured, explained the court, to meet the
deficiencies in Chiarella. Instead of charging that fraud had been perpetrated
upon the sellers of the securities, the theory rejected by the Chiarella Court,
the Newman indictment charged that fraud had been committed upon the
intermediate employer, Morgan Stanley." An impediment to the Newman
court's theory, however, arose from the fact that the language of section
10(b) prohibits fraud only "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."7 " There was no sale or purchase between Newman or his co-
conspirators and Morgan Stanley.
In addressing this problem, the court interpreted the "in connection with
the purchase or sale" language of rule lOb-5 as constituting a limitation
only with respect to which parties have standing to sue.76 The court pointed
out that the statute did not expressly grant private plaintiffs a right to sue.
The private right to sue was judicially created, as was the limitation of that
mail fraud charges. Judge Dumbould did not agree that the deceptive practices alleged against
Newman were securities fraud because they were not "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security." Id. at 20 (Dumbould, J., concurring) (citing § 10(b)).
71. John Newman was the only defendant before the court. Id. at 15. Because Newman
was charged with conspiring with E. Jacques Courtois, an employee of Morgan Stanley who
fled the country, he could be held responsible under conspiracy law for any actions committed
by his fellow conspirators. Id. at 20. Thus, in analyzing the case, Newman may be regarded
as an employee of Morgan Stanley. See United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 11 98,024, 91,290 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981) (Newman has the same fiduciary
duties as Courtois).
72. 664 F.2d at 17.
73. See 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See also supra notes
54-62 and accompanying text.
74. 664 F.2d at 15 ("the Government here has pointed its charge of wrongdoing in a dif-
ferent direction").
75. See supra note 5. The "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" language
is repeated in rule lOb-5. See supra note 7. The Supreme Court has held that rule lOb-5 can
have no wider scope than § 10(b) under which it was promulgated. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 197, 213-14 (1976). See also SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1978)
(breadth of rule can be no greater than the statutory provision), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950
(1979); Note, SEC Rule lob-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 860, 870 (1972)
(rule must be within the bounds of its enabling statute).
76. 664 F.2d at 17. In support of this interpretation the court cited Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S 723 (1975). The Blue Chip Court stated that "one asserting a
claim for damages based on the violation of Rule lOb-5 must be either a purchaser or seller
of securities." Id. at 749.
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right to include only plaintiffs who were purchasers or sellers of securities."
The court concluded, however, that criminal sanctions are expressly permitted
under the statute and, therefore, are not subject to judicial limitations. Thus,
according to the Newman court, standing was an irrelevant issue because
Newman involved a criminal indictment brought by the federal government. 8
The court addressed the meaning of the "in connection with the purchase
or sale" language a second time when it refuted Newman's contention that
even if his conduct was fraudulent, it had no connection with the purchase
or sale of securities. The court found little merit in this argument because,
in its view, the Newman conspirators' sole purpose in misappropriating the
information was to purchase securities. 9
Focusing next on the major issue left unanswered by Chiarella, the Newman
court questioned whether the defendant's participation in the misappropriation
of information from Morgan Stanley and the subsequent use of that infor-
mation in securities transactions was a fraud upon Morgan Stanley and
Morgan Stanley's clients. The court summarily analyzed" the fraud issue,
and characterized Newman's conduct as theft." According to the court, if
Newman had used similar deceitful practices to steal cash or securities directly
from Morgan Stanley, his actions would be characterized as fraud. Thus,
the court concluded that Newman's theft of information was fraud. The
court further maintained that the firm's loss of its reputation for confiden-
tiality was as significant as the loss of money. 2 Therefore, the majority con-
cluded that Newman could be indicted for securities fraud. To buttress this
conclusion, the court pointed out that in other areas of the law, theft of
confidential information, albeit not always described as fraud, consistently
has been held to be unlawful. 3 The court was persuaded that Congress must
77. 664 F.2d at 17. The first case to limit standing to sue to either purchasers or sellers
of securities was Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952). The Birnbaum holding has been cited for this proposition in a large number
of cases. For a listing of these cases, see 5 JACOBS, supra note 8, § 38.01[d]. This limitation
on standing to sue was adopted to prevent a flood of litigation which the courts feared would
result if plaintiffs who had neither purchased nor sold securities could bring an action based
merely on speculative damages. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S 723,
739 (1975). See also Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 708 (D.N.J. 1968)
(flood of litigation would result from more expansive view of standing requirement).
78. 664 F.2d at 17.
79. Id. at 18. The court viewed the connection between Newman's supposed fraud and
the purchase of securities as within the standard of Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971) ("in connection with" should be flexibly interpreted
to include deceptive practices "touching" the sale of securities). One commentator, however,
has noted that this case may have been set adrift into oblivion in light of the Court's retrench-
ment policy. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 795 (5th
ed. 1980).
80. "[W]e need spend little time on the issue of fraud or deceit." 664 F.2d at 17.
81. Id. Chief Justice Burger had applied the term theft to similar conduct by the defendant
in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
82. 664 F.2d at 17.
83. Id. at 18. The court relied on several federal appeals court's decisions. See United States
v. Kent, 608 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1979) (fraud to steal oil company's maps and well completion
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have intended an equally rigorous code of conduct under the Securities Acts."
ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
As a matter of public policy, the result in Newman is commendable. Only
the staunchest defenders of insider trading could find anything socially useful
in Newman's scheme." Indeed, imposition of liability under the factual
scenario in Newman conforms to the original aim of the 1934 Act-protecting
the integrity of the securities market. 6 Additionally, the threat of criminal
penalties for securities fraud may serve as a deterrent for employees in
positions similar to Newman's. In attempting to distinguish Chiarella,
however, the Second Circuit pronounced a new theory of fraud which is
subject to serious doctrinal, statutory, and constitutional questions.
Doctrinally, the Newman court distorts the usual concept -of fraud. In
all its many varieties, 7 legal fraud basically involves a transaction in which
one party, through misrepresentation or through deceitful silence, reaps a
pecuniary reward from the other party to the transaction." In Newman,
however, the supposed victims, Morgan Stanley and its clients, were not the
direct source of Newman's unlawful gain. Although Morgan Stanley and
its clients might have suffered some intangible loss through Newman's breach
of confidentiality, 9 the individuals who sold the stock to Newman's co-
conspirators prior to public disclosure of the corporate acquisition plans were
reports), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.)
(theft and sale of government information was fraud), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979); Ab-
bott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1956) (theft of maps reflecting geophysical infor-
mation constituted fraud where there was prearrangement for their purchase and use to the
detriment of the owner company); United States v. Buckner, 108 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.) (conver-
sion of bondholders' money to private use was fraud), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 669 (1940).
84. 664 F.2d at 18 (purpose of the 1934 Act is not only the prevention of fraud against
investors, but also to seek high standards of business ethics in every facet of the securities
industry) (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774-76 (1979)).
85. See MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AN:D THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (insider trading as a reward
for entrepeneurs is vital to the success of competitive capitalism). But see Schotland, Unsafe
at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV.
1425, 1477 (1967) (insider trading undermines a free, open, and healthy stock market).
86. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13 (1934) (need for new law to restore
investor confidence). The concern by Congress of the need to restore investor confidence which
had been shaken by the 1929 stock market crash was evident during congressional hearings
on the 1934 Act. See Brudney, supra note 25.
87. It has been said of fraud that "age cannot wither, nor custom stale her infinite variety."
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 n.12 (1961).
88. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. See also Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and
Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1936) (fraud consists of misrepresentation by direct state-
ment, conduct, or silence).
89. The court mentioned loss of Morgan Stanley's reputation for maintaining client con-
fidence. 664 F.2d at 17 (1981). Direct pecuniary loss, however, to either Morgan Stanley or
its clients was speculative. See United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,024, 91,301 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981). Cf. H. Wu & A. ZAKER, ELEMENTS
OF INVESTMENTS 442, 443 (1965) (data shows insider trading has no measurable impact on stock
prices).
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the actual sources of Newman's profits. Nonetheless, the Newman court
distorted the traditional concept of fraud and found a criminal violation
under the securities law because the defendant deceived Morgan Stanley, but
reaped a pecuniary reward from shareholders of the target corporation who
were not themselves defrauded under rule 10b-5.
This distortion becomes even more apparent when Newman's misconduct
is evaluated with respect to the language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
The operative statutory language in both the section and the rule prohibits
fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.""0 This
language has been recognized as serving three primary functions: (1) to
establish the class of plaintiffs who have standing to sue; (2) to establish
the class of plaintiffs who are protected by the 1934 Act; and (3) to define
the substantive limitations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.1' Thus, when the
Newman court concluded that rule 10b-5 should be applied in the instant
case because there was no standing problem, its conclusion was inadequate
because it failed to examine whether Newman's conduct was within the
substantive statutory limitations imposed under the "in connection with"
language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
The view that the "in connection with" language is a substantive as well
as procedural limitation under the 1934 Act is compelled by logic and case
law. Conduct which falls outside of that explicitly proscribed by section 10(b)
is not securities fraud . 2 Therefore, logic suggests that the statutory language
must be accorded a broader significance than merely defining the persons
who have standing to sue." The cases interpreting the "in connection with"
language of rule 10b-5 have, for the most part, focused on the limited con-
text of standing to sue in private damage actions." Because the focus of
these cases has been limited to this procedural analysis, courts have not been
required to address the substantive limitations of rule 10b-5. In Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Co.,9 5 however, the first case to limit standing to private
plaintiffs who are either purchasers or sellers, the court did briefly discuss
the broader question of substantive limitations. 6 Similarly, the Texas Gulf
court referred to the substantive limitations of section 10(b) when it explained
that Congress only intended to prohibit the fraudulent or deceptive schemes
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). See supra notes 8-9.
91. 5 JACOBs, supra note 8, § 38.01[a].
92. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (court
makes explicit its finding that alleged conduct fell within coverage of § 10(b)), cert. denied
sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
93. See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977);
5 JACoBS, supra note 8, §§ 38-40.
94. The Newman court referred to the history of the standing requirement but did not draw
this same logical inference. See 664 F.2d at 16 (1981).
95. 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
96. The Birnbaum court looked beyond standing to the scope of the rule in the context
of the underlying statutory scheme. The court concluded that the rule had no relation to breaches
of fidicuary duty by corporate insiders which resulted in fraud upon those who were not pur-
chasers or sellers. 193 F.2d at 463.
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that investors might rely upon in connection with the sale or purchase of
securities.97
Arguably, if the Second Circuit had proceeded to this substantive analysis
it would have concluded that the conduct in Newman fell beyond the pur-
view of section 10(b) and rule lob-5. Specifically, because Newman and his
co-conspirators did not maintain a fiduciary relationship with the shareholders
from whom the stock was purchased, nor engage in securities transactions
with either Morgan Stanley or its clients, the substantive limitations applied.
By refusing to proceed with such an analysis, the Newman court failed to
recognize the warning of the Supreme Court that not every breach of fiduciary
duty can be brought within the ambit of rule 10b-5.98 Instead, the court
found a rule lob-5 violation by focusing on a fiduciary relationship which
clearly was beyond the substantive limitations of the rule. This unprecedented
focus produced a paradoxical result which can best be illustrated by com-
paring the Second Circuit's decisions in Newman and Chiarella. The Newman
court correctly observed that the defendant had engaged in exactly the same
activities as the defendant had in Chiarella.9 In each case, the defendant
stole information which, if made public, would have raised the price of cer-
tain securities. In each case, the defendant or his conspirators purchased
those stocks without disclosing the information. Silence was essential to the
success of both schemes because the defendants' profits depended on buy-
ing the securities before the news of the impending corporate acquisitions
became public. The court in Chiarella viewed the defendant's fraudulent ac-
tions as silence.' 0 The Newman court, on the other hand, viewed the defen-
dant's fraudulent action as disclosing information to his co-conspirators con-
cerning the impending acquisition, thereby, failing to be silent.' ' It seems
wholly inconsistent for the Second Circuit, on essentially the same facts,
to find Newman guilty because he failed to be silent. In fact, John Newman
was equally as silent as Vincent Chiarella because the success of his scheme
depended on it. Yet in both instances, the Second Circuit found a rule 10b-5
violation.
Although this distinction is seemingly untenable, the result in each case
can be attributed to the court's divergent methods of analysis. In Chiarella,
the Second Circuit concluded that the defendant owed a duty to the trading
public in general, and thus, breached that duty by failing to disclose insider
97. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 794 U.S. 976 (1969).
98. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (corporate mismanage-
ment is not fraud under rule 10b-5). Accord AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES
CODE § 1603 comment 3(b) ("fraud still requires something more than unfairness or breach
of fiduciary duty").
99. 644 F.2d at 17.
100. 588 F.2d 1358, 1364-66 (2d Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court also characterized Chiarella's
actions as silence. "This case concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence." Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223 (1980). The Supreme Court, however, did not conclude
that Chiarella's silence was securities fraud. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
101. 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981).
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information." 2 The Supreme Court, in its subsequent reversal of this decision,
ruled that no fiduciary duty exists to the general public, and as such, absent
any fiduciary duty, Chiarella's silence could not be deemed fraud under rule
IOb-5. 103
Faced with the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, the Second Circuit
in Newman undoubtedly sought to identify a fiduciary relationship which
would permit it to hold the defendant liable for securities fraud under
a factual situation similar to that in Chiarella. Thus, the Newman court
focused on the only fiduciary relationship existing in Newman-the
employer/employee relationship between Morgan Stanley and Newman-
and imposed a duty of silence thereunder.' 0 ' While it is undoubtedly true
that Newman and his fellow conspirators breached a duty of loyalty to
Morgan Stanley, such employee misconduct should not amount to securities
fraud. Because Morgan Stanley was not connected with the transaction in
a manner prescribed by rule lOb-5,' 0 Newman's breach of loyalty could not
operate as securities fraud under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The Newman
court's expansive interpretation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 has added
a gloss to the statute which goes beyond its commonly accepted meaning.1"6
Moreover, the court had disregarded the Supreme Court's mandate that
although rule lOb-5 is an elastic catch-all, what it catches must be fraud. 10
The message being conveyed by the Second Circuit is clear-anyone
with insider information must refrain from trading until this information
is publicly disclosed. Although such a protective mandate is commendable,
the court's convoluted analysis has created an unprecedented expansion of
rule lOb-5. By doing so, the Second Circuit's desire to protect the public
manifests a result oriented approach which disregards the substantive limita-
tions of the Securities Act.
A further criticism of the Newman decision stems from the court's decision
to embrace a novel theory of securities fraud which has wide ranging im-
plications beyond the problems of doctrinal distortion and statutory interpre-
tation. Whether phrased in terms of lack of notice or due process, the theory
advanced by the Newman court is constitutionally unsound. The Supreme
Court has observed that, "no one may be required at peril of life, liberty
or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes."'0 8 Yet, it is
ludicrous to expect that the defendant in Newman had clear notice that his
conduct was criminal under rule lOb-5 before the decision in Newman was
102. 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978).
103. 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980).
104. The court cited to the indictment which charged the defendant with a violation of the
fiduciary duties of honesty, loyalty, and silence. 664 F.2d at 16.
105. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
106. The Supreme Court previously criticized the SEC for adding a gloss to the statute in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (cannot read negligence into the statute).
107. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
108. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
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rendered.' 9 In addition to the lack of notice in the statutory language and
the judicial precedent"' previously discussed, other possible sources of notice
are equally ambiguous. The SEC itself has been unclear about how to regulate
non-insider trading based upon advance knowledge of a tender offer."' Nor
can notice be found in SEC enforcement actions against defendants essen-
tially in Newman's position. Such actions have generally ended in consent
decrees" 2 rather than full blown litigation. Thus, although the consent decrees
may give notice of the SEC's displeasure with Newman-like behavior, they
do not constitute precedent sufficient to establish fair notice of possible
criminal sanctions."
3
Finally, while Newman, as a sophisticated market professional, may have
realized his conduct was ethically questionable, such knowledge does not serve
as notice of a criminal violation of the securities laws. The Supreme Court
has maintained that the scope of a criminal statute must be determined by
109. Brodsky, Securities Litigation, 182 N.Y.L.J. 2 (Sept. 19, 1979.) (discussing a parallel
problem in the Second Circuit opinion in Chiarella).
110. The Supreme Court expressed concern about the lack of notice in Chiarella. 445 U.S.
at 235 n.20. The Court cited to Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), where
it had stated that a law must be clear enough to provide a person of ordinary intelligence
the opportunity to know what is prohibited. Id. at 108. See also Dunn v. United States, 442
U.S. 100, 112-13 (1979) (boundaries of criminal conduct must be marked with special clarity);
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (due process is violated when terms
of statute must be guessed at by those of ordinary intelligence); United States v. Chiarella,
588 F.2d 1358, 1376-78 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (notice as to what is forbidden must emanate
from language of statute); United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 98,024 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981) (Newman did not have sufficient notice). But see
United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 356 (9th Cir.) (Sneed, J., concurring) ("in fixing
criminal liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, we attach reduced importance to asser-
tions of vagueness"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
111. The SEC had engaged in a 10 year debate with securities professionals over the practice
of "warehousing," a scheme whereby a tender offeror gives large institutional investors notice
of its plans so that they can purchase target stock before there is a price rise. The practice
has some similarities to the conduct in Newman. The district court, after reviewing the history
of the debate, concluded that no clear understanding of the law existed from which Newman
could have been put on notice. See United States States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,024, 91,292 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981) (reviews the history of
tender offer regulation and concludes that confused state of the law deprived Newman of notice).
112. See, e.g., SEC v. Manderano, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 96,357 (D.N.J. 1978) (consent decree issued where printer alleged to have illegally traded
"stock of the week" before its publication in Value Line Investment Survey); SEC v. Primar
Typographers, Inc., 11976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,734 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (consent decree issued where defendant alleged to have known the target of future tender
offer before such information made public). In a consent decree, the defendant consents to
a remedy, but neither admits nor denies any violation. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student
Mktg. Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,217 (company con-
sented to injunction prohibiting it from engaging in future illegal business practices without
admitting or denying the charges).
113. Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1976) (consent
decree against defendant cannot be included in support of private plaintiff's complaint).
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reference to an objective standard. '1 4 Newman's subjective views about his
conduct could not transform his actions, no matter how egregious, into con-
duct criminal under rule 1Ob-5.
ALTERNATIVES
Although Newman's actions do not violate rule lOb-5, there are other
mechanisms that could be implemented to prohibit conduct similar to
Newman's. One such mechanism is rule 14e-31" which was recently pro-
mulgated under section 14(e)"I of the 1934 Act. Rule 14e-3 provides that
once a tender offer is substantially under way, no one possessing material
information about the offer may trade in the security without disclosing that
information to the public."' Although the rule is yet untested, it clearly ob-
viates several of the glaring deficiencies in Newman. Because the rule
specifically prohibits anyone with inside information from trading, there is
no need to distinguish insiders from outsiders or to identify a fiduciary
relationship. The clarity of the rule eliminates the lack of notice which marred
Newman. Such an approach may find favor when conduct similar to
Newman's confronts the Supreme Court. Indeed, the use of a clear rule
should be appealing to the Court because of the Court's distinct preference
for restricting the scope of securities laws to their plain language.'
Alternatively, the contorted analysis utilized by the Newman court to in-
voke the provisions of rule lOb-5 could be avoided by employing state agency
principles." 9 Agency law, as summed-up in the Restatement (Second) of Agen-
114. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 355 n.5 (1964) (notice cannot be based on
subjective expectations of particular defendants); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391-93 (1926) (terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit so as to put one on
notice of what conduct is prohibited).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981), provides:
If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced,
a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive
or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for
any other person who is in possession of material information relating to such tender
offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which
he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person, (2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought
by such tender offer, or (3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other
person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell
or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities . . . unless within a reasonable
time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly
disclosed by press release or otherwise.
See generally Note, Trading on Nonpublic Information Under Rule 14e-3, 49 GEO. L. REV.
539 (1981).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
117. See supra note 115.
118. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (scope of a rule cannot
be construed more broadly than the language of the statute).
119. The Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of preserving and employing state law
concepts where appropriate in the securities context. "[W~e are reluctant to federalize the substan-
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cy, provides that an agent is under a duty to his principal not to disclose
confidential information acquired [from the principal] in the course of his
agency. ' Newman's misappropration of information from Morgan Stanley
could be seen as a violation of this agency principle. Clearly, there was an
alternative available upon which the Second Circuit could have relied to find
Newman's conduct culpable without broadly interpreting section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5.
CONCLUSION
In Newman v. United States, the Second Circuit confronted a securities
fraud issue that had not been expressly addressed by the Supreme Court.
The court determined that an outsider who owes no fiduciary duty to either
the acquiring or target corporation involved in a tender offer may be
charged with criminal securities fraud when he misappropriates nonpublic
information regarding that tender offer from a company to which he owes
a fiduciary duty.
Newman is commendable for its attempt to provide an enforcement
mechanism against acts which threaten to undermine investor confidence in
the securities market. The decision is flawed, however, by its novel and
distorted theory of securities fraud. The novelty of the theory has the
additional defect of depriving the defendant of notice concerning the possible
illegality of his activity. Further, by not thoroughly analyzing the language
of the 1934 Act, Newman brings within the ambit of rule lOb-5 conduct
which could be adequately regulated by state agency law.
Michael J. Falconer
tial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly
where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden." Id. at 479.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
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